CCHOPE ELECTION 2001

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In Domino v. Comelec [G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999],  the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Davide Jr. reiterated "that the term "residence", as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."

As in Marcos, the main issue in Domino was whether petitioner had complied with the constitutional requirement that a member of the House of Representatives must be a resident of the district which he or she seeks to represent "for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election [Sec. 6,  Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution]."

Answering in the negative, the Court reiterated the three-fold traditional rule governing domicile; "namely (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established, it remains until new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time."

Applying these rules, the ponencia held that while Petitioner Juan Domino's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that [while] sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City XXX," nevertheless failed to demonstrate the he has "established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani" which he sought to represent in Congress.

The Court added that "[a]s a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, [namely] physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention."

Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Domino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
See also: 255 SCRA XI, October 25, 1995. The ponencia was written by Mr. Justice Kapunan
Source: Leadership by Example, Justice Artemio Panganiban, November 1999.

 

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Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution states:

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decision in Aquino v. COMELEC,16 [248 SCRA 400, 420-421 (1995)] as follows: Supreme

. . . [T]he place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. Court

In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of live birth of private respondent’s second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show that private respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.

There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding.

Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at least until June 22, 1997, is shown by the following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1) his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voter’s registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995. Jlexj

The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino,17 [96 Phil. 294 (1954)] this Court held that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.

Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran. Under the law,18 [LGC, §39(a).] what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province, not in any district or municipality, one year before the election.

Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:19 [248 SCRA 301, 326 (1995)]

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan.

As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera,20 [73 Phil. 453, 459 (1941)] in which this Court held: "[W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected." In this case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of that province’s Third District.

En Banc, Justice Mendoza,MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, respondents. [G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999]



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Last Updated: Monday, April 23, 2001 01:15:34 AM