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PRE-PROCLAMATION SHALL BE HEARD SUMMARILY AFTER DUE NOTICE SECOND.
Respondent COMELEC failed to be faithful to section 3 of Rule 27 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that "all
pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily after due
notice x x x."24
[Section 3. Summary hearing and disposition of pre-proclamation
controversies. – All pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard
summarily after due notice provided that pre-proclamation controversies on
election returns or certificates of canvass shall, on the basis of the
records and evidence to it by the board of canvassers, be disposed of
summarily by the Commission en banc within seven (7) days from receipt
thereof x x x.] The records will show that petitioner was not
furnished any notice of the pre-proclamation proceedings against him
from beginning to end. Respondent Natividad did not give petitioner copies
of his notices of appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. Nor was petitioner given copies of private respondent’s
petitions and motions filed with the COMELEC. Even the COMELEC’s Second
Division failed to notify petitioner about the promulgation of its Order
dated June 9, 1998 which dismissed the pre-proclamation cases against him
for being moot and academic. He was not also given a copy of private
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration against said Order. Also, he was
not furnished a copy of the July 4, 1998 Order of the Comelec (2nd
Division) which elevated respondent Natividad’s Motion for
Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. All that petitioner
received from the COMELEC on October 8, 1998 was its en banc
resolution annulling his proclamation.
Kycalr It cannot be denied that petitioner Velayo is a
real party in interest. As the proclaimed Mayor, petitioner stands to be
prejudiced by whatever action COMELEC may take on the appeals filed by
respondent Natividad. His non-inclusion as
respondent and his lack of notice of the proceedings in the COMELEC which
resulted in the cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial
of due process. En
Banc, Justice Puno,
ARTHUR V. VELAYO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND ERNESTO NATIVIDAD, respondents
[G.R. No. 135613. March 9, 2000] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + NOTICE IS REQUIRED FOR THE VALIDITY OF ELECTION "It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place and purpose thereof. The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance. The requirement of notice even becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was called by some authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a substantial compliance therewith so it may fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute has been carried out. The sufficiency of notice is determined on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and purpose of the elections so as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and express their will or on other hand, whether the omission resulted in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified electors of the opportunity of exercising their franchise so as to change the result of the election." PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION SHALL BE HEARD AFTER DUE NOTICE As regards the second, third and fourth grounds, DIANGKA would have this Court analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings before the COMELEC on the ground that she was denied due process. We find that DIANGKA was not denied due process. DIANGKA was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on her disqualification based on the commission of acts of terrorism was not strong. On July 21, 1998, she filed her Answer to the petition to disqualify her. On August 24, 1998 she submitted her memorandum. The COMELEC Second Division considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. As stated by this Court in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections,18 [275 SCRA 762 (1997)] "[t]he hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be heard." The COMELEC gave DIANGKA all the opportunity to be heard. DIANGKA cannot also fault the COMELEC for not
conducting clarificatory questioning and/or cross-examination of the
witnesses; or that witness Hadji Naif Amerol did not appear nor affirm his
affidavit during the hearing before the COMELEC. Again, our ingrained
jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously
applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for
the proceeding to be summary in character.19
[Nolasco vs. Comelec, 275 SCRA 762 (1997)] Pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions
for disqualifications are subject to summary hearings.20
[Rule 25, SEC. 4. Summary Proceeding. – The petition shall be
heard summarily after due notice.] In relation thereto, Section 3,
Rule 1721
[Rule 17, SEC. 3. Oral Testimony Dispensed with Where Proceedings are
Summary. – When the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of
oral testimony, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit
their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and
other documentary evidence; and then there is a need for clarification of
certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission or the Division, the
parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants. xxx.......xxx.......xxx.]
of the said Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the
COMELEC whether clarificatory questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants,
and whether the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to
cross-examine said witnesses-affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en
banc reviews and evaluates a party’s petition, or as in the case at
bar, a party’s answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the
same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.22
[Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 260 SCRA 604 (1996)] In fine, there is no showing that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Resolutions subject of the instant petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division) dated September 2, 1998 and Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated August 24, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.
EN BANC,
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:, MAIMONA H. N. M. S. DIANGKA, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ATTY. ALI M. BALINDONG, respondents.HA[G.R.
No. 139545. January 28, 2000]
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CCHOPE ELECTION
2001 
