CCHOPE ELECTION 2001

DUE PROCESS REQUIRED TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING

Thus, this petition raises the question of whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion in: (1) ruling on private respondent Restor’s letter-petition without according notice and hearing to petitioner; (2) taking cognizance of the letter-petition which was not filed by a real party in interest; (3) resolving the letter-petition en banc, instead of first referring it to one of its Divisions; and finally, (4) disallowing petitioner’s use of the nickname "JTV" and ordering the election officers of Occidental Mindoro to consider invalid all votes cast in that appellation.

The petition also impleads as a necessary respondent Ricardo Quintos, who ran opposite petitioner for the lone congressional post of Occidental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections, in view of "confirmed reports" that he will file an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET") invoking the questioned resolutions. Private respondents validated this allegation when they declared that private respondent Quintos has in fact filed such an election protest case, docketed as HRET Case No. 98-030.^.5 [Private Respondents’ Motion to Resolve Case, 3-4.]

In its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General observed that even if the letter-petition was treated as an "election matter" which may be properly heard firsthand by the Commission en banc, the Commission should have given notice to petitioner before resolving the issue therein, especially since the petitioner stands to be adversely affected should the petition be granted. On the issue of the validity of the use of "JTV" as petitioner’s nickname, it opined that petitioner may validly use the same as she is in fact Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa, and hence, there is no misrepresentation. Moreover, no one among the other candidates had the same initials as to be prejudiced by her use of the same.

The petition is impressed with merit.

It stands uncontested that petitioner came to know of the letter-petition lodged against her by private respondent Restor only upon receipt of a copy of the COMELEC Resolution issued on May 11, 1998, which she received by fax at 5:32 in the afternoon of the same day. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Commission passed upon the letter-petition without affording petitioner the opportunity to explain her side and to counter the allegations of private respondent Restor’s letter-petition. Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the twin requirements of notice and hearing must be observed.^.6 [Salafranca vs. Philamlife Village Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 121791, December 23, 1998; Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120575, December 16, 1998; Autobus Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117453, June 26, 1998.] Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission in the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 1998, that "JTV" is not a nickname by which petitioner is generally or popularly known, was drawn purely from the allegations of the letter-petition and for this reason, the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Scsdaad

Interminably, we have declared that deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.^.7 [Salonga vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 534; Rodriguez vs. Project 6 Market Service, 247 SCRA 528; Mendiola vs. Civil Service Commission, 221 SCRA 295.] However, we find the foregoing rule inapplicable to the circumstances of the case at bench.

As earlier narrated, petitioner filed an "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" with the Commission on May 12, 1998, which the Commission promptly denied the following day. By its own designation, the two-page pleading filed by petitioner is one part manifestation and one part motion. On the main, it enters appearance of petitioner, who was not impleaded in private respondent Restor’s letter-petition, and communicates receipt of the May 11, 1998 Resolution. Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said resolution by invoking due process, it does not purport to embody petitioner’s grounds and arguments for reconsideration. Rather, it states that "(petitioner) reserve(s) all rights and waive(s) none, including filing a supplemental motion for reconsideration, pending retaining additional counsel" as the lawyer representing petitioner at the time was saddled with other commitments.^.8 [Urgent Manifestation and Motion, Annex "H" of Petition.] In filing this "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" on the second day of canvassing of votes, and immediately after receipt of the contested resolution, it is obvious that petitioner’s immediate concern for doing so was not mainly to exercise her right to be heard, but to have the Commission seasonably reconsider the May 11, 1998 Resolution while canvassing was still at the precinct or municipal level.

While the filing of a supplemental motion for reconsideration is not a matter of right, it is believed that the judicious thing for the Commission to have done, considering the obvious due process issues brought about by the May 11, 1998 Resolution, was to afford petitioner a chance to explain why she should be allowed to use the nickname "JTV", such as by requiring her to submit a supplemental motion for reconsideration. We consider this more in consonance with our rulings in Salonga and Rodriguez on opportunity to be heard on reconsideration. Thus, we find that respondent COMELEC acted imprudently and in excess of its jurisdiction in treating the "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" as petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the May 11, 1998 Resolution, and in summarily dismissing the same. 

En Banc, Justice Gonzaga-Reyes, MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ATTY. DAN RESTOR, respondents. RICARDO QUINTOS, necessary respondent.  [G.R. No. 133927. November 29, 1999]

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We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No.98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling.36 [Reyes vs. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 (1980)] In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case.37 [Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 752 (1980)] The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner , without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:38 [218 SCRA 782 (1993)]

"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing."39 [At p. 792.]

Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing because the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made. We reject the argument. Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

"Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies.-- The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections."

The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and hearing is required. This is clear from the language of the law.

We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due process requirement. The law requires that the hearing be held before the COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the public respondent first issued an order annulling the proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of the hearing. We explained in Farinas vs. COMELEC40 [G.R. No. 81763, March 10, 1988 (Minute Resolution)] the pernicious effect of such procedure:

"As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 'to sanction the immediate annulment or even the suspension of the effects of a proclamation before the petition seeking such annulment or suspension of its effects shall have been heard would open the floodgates of unsubstantiated petitions after the results are known, considering the propensity of the losing candidates to put up all sorts of obstacles in an open display of unwillingness to accept defeat, or would encourage the filing of baseless petitions not only to the damage and prejudice of winning candidates but also to the frustration of the sovereign will of the electorate.'" (citations omitted)

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. It set aside the proclamation made by the district board of canvassers for the position of congressman upon finding that it was tainted with illegality.

We cannot accept public respondent's argument.

Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However , the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.41 [35A Words and Phrases 463.] The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED. This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC and the Commission is hereby ordered to hold a hearing on the issues presented in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, and thereafter render a decision based on the evidence adduced and the applicable laws. The incident of whether or not petitioner may continue discharging the functions of the office of congressman pending resolution of the case on its merit shall be addressed by the COMELEC in the exercise of its reasonable discretion.

En Banc, Justice Puno, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CANUTO SENEN A. ORETA, respondents [G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000]

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Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing because the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made. We reject the argument. Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

"Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies.-- The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections."

The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and hearing is required. This is clear from the language of the law.

We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due process requirement. The law requires that the hearing be held before the COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the public respondent first issued an order annulling the proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of the hearing. We explained in Farinas vs. COMELEC40 [G.R. No. 81763, March 10, 1988 (Minute Resolution)] the pernicious effect of such procedure:

"As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 'to sanction the immediate annulment or even the suspension of the effects of a proclamation before the petition seeking such annulment or suspension of its effects shall have been heard would open the floodgates of unsubstantiated petitions after the results are known, considering the propensity of the losing candidates to put up all sorts of obstacles in an open display of unwillingness to accept defeat, or would encourage the filing of baseless petitions not only to the damage and prejudice of winning candidates but also to the frustration of the sovereign will of the electorate.'" (citations omitted)

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. It set aside the proclamation made by the district board of canvassers for the position of congressman upon finding that it was tainted with illegality.

We cannot accept public respondent's argument.

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Last Updated: Wednesday, April 25, 2001 10:38:03 PM