|
|
|
|
TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS As regards the second, third and fourth grounds, DIANGKA would have this Court analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings before the COMELEC on the ground that she was denied due process. We find that DIANGKA was not denied due process. DIANGKA was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on her disqualification based on the commission of acts of terrorism was not strong. On July 21, 1998, she filed her Answer to the petition to disqualify her. On August 24, 1998 she submitted her memorandum. The COMELEC Second Division considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. As stated by this Court in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections,18 [275 SCRA 762 (1997)] "[t]he hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be heard." The COMELEC gave DIANGKA all the opportunity to be heard. DIANGKA cannot also fault the COMELEC for not
conducting clarificatory questioning and/or cross-examination of the
witnesses; or that witness Hadji Naif Amerol did not appear nor affirm his
affidavit during the hearing before the COMELEC. Again, our ingrained
jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously
applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for
the proceeding to be summary in character.19
[Nolasco vs. Comelec, 275 SCRA 762 (1997)] Pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions
for disqualifications are subject to summary hearings.20
[Rule 25, SEC. 4. Summary Proceeding. – The petition shall be
heard summarily after due notice.] In relation thereto, Section 3,
Rule 1721
[Rule 17, SEC. 3. Oral Testimony Dispensed with Where Proceedings are
Summary. – When the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of
oral testimony, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit
their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and
other documentary evidence; and then there is a need for clarification of
certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission or the Division, the
parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants. xxx.......xxx.......xxx.]
of the said Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the
COMELEC whether clarificatory questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants,
and whether the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to
cross-examine said witnesses-affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en
banc reviews and evaluates a party’s petition, or as in the case at
bar, a party’s answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the
same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.22
[Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 260 SCRA 604 (1996)] In fine, there is no showing that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Resolutions subject of the instant petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division) dated September 2, 1998 and Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated August 24, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.
EN BANC,
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:, MAIMONA H. N. M. S. DIANGKA, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ATTY. ALI M. BALINDONG, respondents.HA[G.R.
No. 139545. January 28, 2000] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
For any
inquiries or comment, you may contact the WEBMASTER
|
CCHOPE ELECTION
2001 
