CCHOPE ELECTION 2001

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MODE OF REVIEW IN ELECTION CASES

While the instant petition challenges the trial court’s orders denying petitioner’s motion to quash the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and 49942, the grounds relied upon by petitioner are directed at the validity of Resolution No. 98-2914 of the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner prays that said resolution be declared null and void.7 [Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 13.]

This petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the COMELEC.

Resolution No. 98-2914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en banc on October 29, 1998. Petitioner’s remedy was to seek its annulment by way of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64, §2 provides:

SEC. 2. Mode of Review. ¾ A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the resolution sought to be reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The present petition to set aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to quash and motion for reconsideration was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after Resolution No. 98-2194 was promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently, the resolution is now final and binding upon the parties. Maniks

Even if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, the same is not void. Since it has become final and executory, it is already binding and effective.8 [See Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 75 (1988)]

COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the election laws immediately final and executory, as petitioner contends?

The contention is untenable. In support of his claims, petitioner cites Rule 13, §1(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC which provides:

SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:

. . . .

(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision; . . . .

The above quoted provision, however, is taken from the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which has already been amended. The 1993 Rules of Procedure, now provides:

Rule 13. - Prohibited Pleadings.

SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. ¾ The following pleadings are not allowed:

. . . .

(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; . . . (Emphasis added).

Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is allowed in cases involving election offenses.

Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Hence, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.

Petitioner likewise invokes Rule 34, §10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that ¾ Manikanx

SEC. 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal. ¾ Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers may be made only to the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials, provided, however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power to motu proprio review, revise, modify or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said appeals shall be immediately executory and final. (Emphasis added)

Even a cursory reading of the above rule, however, will show that it governs appeals from the action of the State Prosecutor or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers. The present case does not involve such an appeal but a resolution of the COMELEC itself in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases.9 [Comelec Rules of Procedure, Rule 34, §1 provides that:

SECTION 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. ¾ The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.] Such distinction can be easily explained.

In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated power10 [The basis of such power is Rule 34, §2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that ¾

SEC. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government. ¾ The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission.] to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating officer submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve the issue of probable cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the Commission of its review powers would, at this point, already constitute a second look on the issue of probable cause, the COMELEC’s ruling on the appeal would be immediately final and executory.

On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon which the Commission’s Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which determines the existence of probable cause.11 [Rule 34, §9(b) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that ¾

(b) In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an information in court against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate court.] Consequently, an appeal to the Commission is unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original resolution, in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal or motu proprio, may review the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.

Reliance by petitioner upon Rule 34, §10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is thus without any basis.

Justice Mendoza, En Banc, Faelnar v. People, Codilla, COMELEC, [G.R. Nos. 140850-51. May 4, 2000]



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Last Updated: Thursday, April 19, 2001 12:21:45 AM