CCHOPE ELECTION 2001

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PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS 

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

Since ABALLE has appealed to the COMELEC from the decision in Election Protest Case No. 30 of the MTCC, by filing a Notice of Appeal on 22 January 1998, and submitting at the same time the postal money orders for the appeal fees, it follows that the COMELEC has primary jurisdiction on the petition for certiorari to annul the execution pending appeal granted by the MTCC. This is an issue which we resolved in Relampagos v. Cumba, et al. (243 SCRA 690 [1995]). 

We ruled in Relampagos that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1 (should be Section 2) Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the election contest in question. In such cases the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The last paragraph of Section 50 reads:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Commission on Elections has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia, contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The contested position in this case is that of a barangay captain. The Municipal Trial Court of Calbayog City, a court of limited jurisdiction, had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the election protest, and the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such protest.

It follows then that the RTC of Calbayog City is without jurisdiction on the petition for certiorari and prohibition which ABALLE filed to annul the execution pending appeal the MTCC had issued in the election protest case. ABALLE should have gone to the COMELEC and her allegation that it was impossible for her to have invoked the power of the COMELEC to issue the writ because the records of the Election Protest No. 130 were forwarded to the COMELEC only in August 1998 merits no sympathy as certified copies of the challenged resolutions or orders could easily be obtained and attached to the petition.

Clearly respondent Judge Navidad acted without jurisdiction, and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he entertained the petition in Special Civil Action No. 98-040, issued a Temporary Restraining Order thereon and, ultimately, giving due course to the petition and deciding it on its merits by setting aside and vacating the assailed resolutions and orders of the MTCC of Calbayog City in Election Protest No. 130 and making permanent the temporary restraining order earlier issued.

Further, respondent Judge Navidad gravely abused his discretion when he extended by twenty days the 72-hour restraining order he initially issued. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that "in no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein."

CJ Davide, First Division, Beso v. Aballe and Hon. Navidad [G.R. No. 134932. February 18, 2000]

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First. Respondents contend that the instant petition should be dismissed for being premature, because petitioner has a pending motion for reconsideration of the resolution, dated August 18, 1998, of the COMELEC.

We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution of the COMELEC in question is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it had only one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.7 [Faelnar v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 140850-51, May 4, 2000.] Rule 13, §1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

What Pleadings are Not Allowed. ¾ The following pleadings are not allowed:

. . . .

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases;

. . . .

As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire.

The COMELEC contends that petitioner should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of his motion for reconsideration, which he has not formally withdrawn. Indeed, it would have been more appropriate for petitioner to first withdraw his motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC before filing the present petition. Nevertheless, the filing by petitioner of the instant petition and his reply to the comments of respondents ¾ where he admitted that, except in cases involving election offenses, a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the COMELEC en banc is a prohibited pleading8 [Reply to Comment of the COMELEC; Rollo, pp. 142-144.] ¾ sufficiently indicated his intention to abandon his motion for reconsideration.

En Banc, Justice Mendoza, DIOSCORO O. ANGELIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENTINO R. TAN, respondents [G.R. No. 135468. May 31, 2000]

 

 


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Last Updated: Tuesday, April 24, 2001 10:12:43 AM