CCHOPE ELECTION 2001

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QUAISI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION

To the above rule, private respondents take exception by stating that the subject letter-petition posed issues which were administrative in character, and, thus, not subject to the requirement of referral to division which applies only in the Commission’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.

In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148, he noted that

(t)he term "administrative" connotes, or pertains, to "administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.

While a "quasi-judicial function" is

a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature..12 [Midland Insurance Corporation, 143 SCRA 458.]

Thus, in Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 10 SCRA 46,.13 [Also cited in Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Education Secretary, 153 SCRA 622.] we held that where the fixing of power rates, which are to apply exclusively to a particular party, is based upon a report of the General Auditing Office, and which fact is denied by the affected party, the making of such finding of fact by respondent administrative agency is a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character.

A directive by the Commission to disallow petitioner’s use of the nickname "JTV" for purposes of her candidacy, on the basis of Resolution No. 2977.14 [See note 4.], clearly necessitates a determination of whether petitioner is in fact not generally or popularly known as such in the locality of Occidental Mindoro. Indubitably, since it involved the application of law or rules to an ascertained set of facts, it called for the Commission’s exercise of its adjudicatory powers and falls within the concept of an "election contest" in the sense contemplated by Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution.

We cannot agree with the view advanced by private respondents that because the petition below cannot be classified as a case falling under Rules 20 to 33 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15 [These Rules refer to particular actions or proceedings, i.e., ordinary actions – election protest and quo warranto; special actions – petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy, proceedings against nuisance candidates, postponement or suspension of elections; special cases – pre-proclamation controversies; special reliefs – certiorari, prohibition or mandamus in aid of the Commission’s limited appellate jurisdiction over courts of general jurisdiction, contempt; provisional remedies – injunction; special proceedings – annulment of permanent list of voters, registration of political parties or organizations, which the Commission, sitting in Divisions, is required to hear and decide.], it is not a quasi-judicial matter and may thus be dealt with firsthand by the Commission en banc. Private respondent Restor’s letter-petition clearly asks, not only for the invalidation of "JTV" as petitioner’s authorized nickname, but also the nullification of all votes cast in that name..16 [Letter-Petition to COMELEC, Annex "G" of Petition.] We are hard put to treat the issue as administrative when petitioner stands to be so adversely affected by the relief asked for. That the petition below was in the form of a letter does not make the issues posed therein less substantial. As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, "(t)o sustain the ruling of the COMELEC is to open venues for commission of fraud, as one simply needs to write a letter to the COMELEC asking that votes for a candidate be nullified on the ground that the nickname used is inappropriate or not valid."

The remaining issue pertains to the validity of votes cast in the name "JTV". In view of the fact that the election protest of private respondent Quintos is presently pending in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we resolve to leave this matter to the resolution of the said body as the sole judge of all contests respecting the election, returns and qualifications of its members..17 [Sec. 17, Art. VI, Constitution.] Oldmiso

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the COMELEC Resolutions dated May 11, 1998 and May 13, 1998, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

En Banc, Justice Gonzaga, MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ATTY. DAN RESTOR, respondents.RICARDO QUINTOS, necessary respondent. [G.R. No. 133927. November 29, 1999]

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We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No.98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling.36 [Reyes vs. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 (1980)] In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case.37 [Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 752 (1980)] The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner , without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:38 [218 SCRA 782 (1993)]

"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing."39 [At p. 792.]

Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing because the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made. We reject the argument. Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

"Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies.-- The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections."

The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and hearing is required. This is clear from the language of the law.

We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due process requirement. The law requires that the hearing be held before the COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the public respondent first issued an order annulling the proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of the hearing. We explained in Farinas vs. COMELEC40 [G.R. No. 81763, March 10, 1988 (Minute Resolution)] the pernicious effect of such procedure:

"As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 'to sanction the immediate annulment or even the suspension of the effects of a proclamation before the petition seeking such annulment or suspension of its effects shall have been heard would open the floodgates of unsubstantiated petitions after the results are known, considering the propensity of the losing candidates to put up all sorts of obstacles in an open display of unwillingness to accept defeat, or would encourage the filing of baseless petitions not only to the damage and prejudice of winning candidates but also to the frustration of the sovereign will of the electorate.'" (citations omitted)

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. It set aside the proclamation made by the district board of canvassers for the position of congressman upon finding that it was tainted with illegality.

We cannot accept public respondent's argument.

Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However , the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.41 [35A Words and Phrases 463.] The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED. This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC and the Commission is hereby ordered to hold a hearing on the issues presented in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, and thereafter render a decision based on the evidence adduced and the applicable laws. The incident of whether or not petitioner may continue discharging the functions of the office of congressman pending resolution of the case on its merit shall be addressed by the COMELEC in the exercise of its reasonable discretion.

En Banc, Justice Puno, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CANUTO SENEN A. ORETA, respondents [G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000]

 

 


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Last Updated: Wednesday, April 25, 2001 10:01:38 PM