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Finally, respondent COMELEC’s resort to the doctrine of statistical improbability is flawed. As observed by petitioner Velayo, from experiences in past elections, respondent COMELEC should be aware that it is possible for one candidate or even a few candidates to get zero votes in one or a few precincts. In his Memorandum, petitioner Velayo attached some Statement of Votes as Annexes A to A-5, where it can be readily gleaned that there were not a few candidates who obtained zero votes in certain precincts in that particular election. Standing alone and without more, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received zero votes in one or two precincts can not adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically improbable. A no-vote for a particular candidate in election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that those election returns were prepared under "duress, force and intimidation."35 [Sangki v. COMELEC, et al., 21 SCRA 1392 (1967).] In the case of Una Kibad v. Comelec,36 [23 SCRA 588 (1968).] we warned that the doctrine on statistical improbability must be viewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing the fraudulent and corrupt practices, which indeed is called for, innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result which hardly commends itself. This specially applies to the case at bar where respondent COMELEC’s ruling is premised on questionable affidavits of private respondent’s witnesses, and election returns which appear to be regular on their face. Moreover, the doctrine of statistical improbability involves a question of fact and a more prudential approach prohibits its determination ex parte.
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CCHOPE ELECTION
2001 
