ABSOLUTE MORAL NORMS

An absolute moral norm is a specific norm that is true without exceptions. Almost everyone agrees that there are general principles that are true without exception (act out of love, act justly, and so on). There is fierce debate, however, about whether there are any specific exceptionless moral norms, that is, moral norms that exclude specific types of choices, such as the choice of contraception, of killing innocent people, of extramarital sex, and so on. The constant teaching of the Church is that there are certain moral absolutes, moral norms that are universally true without exceptions.

Most moral norms are nonabsolute. For example, one ought to return what is lent to one; one ought to keep one’s promises. But these norms have exceptions: One should not return a gun to the person who lent it if he is now insane; one should not keep a promise to meet one’s friend this morning if doing so would mean neglecting one’s child after a serious accident. Also, none of the specific affirmative moral norms are absolute. Our life is varied, and so there is no specific action we are required to do at all times.

However, there are some specific negative moral norms that are true without exception: One ought not to torture a child to obtain desired information; one ought not to rape. Also, although less popular in our culture: One ought not to fornicate, contracept, commit adultery, or intentionally kill innocent people. Despite their logically negative form, these absolutes are extremely important. They indicate the high respect we owe to the fundamental goods of persons that are the basis of all moral norms.

Object, Intention, Circumstances • To explain this point, natural law theorists have found it helpful to distinguish between the object of an act, its intention, and its circumstances; these are three distinct aspects of the moral act. This distinction is repeated by the Catechism of the Catholic Church (cf. 1749ff.). The object is the primary and most proximate thing one would honestly answer if asked, “What are you doing?” The intention and the object are distinct in this way: One chooses to do something for the sake of some end; that for the sake of which one chooses is the intention; the something one chooses is called the object of the act. So, if one lies in order to escape detection, escaping detection is the end and lying is the object. If one gives alms for the sake of appearing holy, giving alms is the object and appearing holy is the end. The circumstances are the other aspects of the act not included in the end and object: where it is done, when, with whom, with what instruments, and so on.

In order for the act to be morally good, all three (object, intention, and circumstances) must be good. A defect in any of the three makes the whole act morally evil. Thus, an otherwise good act, one that is good in its object and circumstances, may become bad because of the intention. For example, a man gives alms (object) in appropriate circumstances, but for the sake of seducing someone – a bad intention and therefore a bad act. Similarly, a married couple’s choice to express their marriage sexually is a morally good object, and their intention may be good, but they may violate reasonable standards of public modesty; the circumstances make an otherwise good act bad. And, most importantly, if the intention of an act is good and circumstances are appropriate, but the object is bad, then the act is morally bad. For instance, killing an innocent person (bad object) in order to support one’s family (good intention) is a morally bad act.

In the last thirty years, there has been much controversy, even within Catholic circles, on these points. Some theologians hold, against what was just said, that one cannot morally evaluate the object of the act apart from all of its circumstances, especially the foreseeable consequences. Proponents of teleological ethics, or proportionalism, argue that one may choose to destroy, damage, or impede a basic human good, such as life or truth, for the sake of bringing about a proportionate end or averting terrible consequences. So, according to them, one cannot say of any specific type of choice that it will always be morally bad; it is always possible that some circumstances might arise in which such a choice would be justified for the sake of averting bad consequences.

The Teaching of the Church • However, this position conflicts with the constant teaching of the Church from her earliest days. In his Letter to the Romans, St. Paul teaches that it is not right to say that “one may do evil that good may come from it” (Rom 3:8). Throughout the history of the Church, this has been read in its obvious sense as meaning that, as St. Augustine put it, it is never morally right to do what is intrinsically evil (secundum se malum) for the sake of a good end (cf. Augustine’s Against Lying, Ch. 7).

Proportionalists have said, however, that they do not deny what St. Paul affirms. They agree with him that one may not do a moral evil for the sake of a good end. Still, they say, St. Paul’s statement does not exclude proportionalism, namely, that one may do a premoral evil for the sake of a (proportionate) end.
It is true that, when St. Paul denies that “one may do evil that good may come from it,” he means moral evil, not premoral or nonmoral evil. However, this scarcely helps the proportionalist cause. For St. Paul could not say that one should not do moral evil so that good may come from it unless he was presupposing that it is possible to determine, independently of what good or bad will come from an act, that it is a moral evil.

Moreover, the context shows that he is speaking precisely about a situation where an evil act apparently will bring about a great good. In this part of the letter, St. Paul argues that even out of our sins good consequences will flow, since God will take their occasion to show forth his justice. His point is that, even if that is the case, it is outrageous to say one should do evil so that good should come from it: to accuse authorized teachers of saying that is slander, Paul says (cf. Rom 3:8).

In his 1993 encyclical on moral principles The Splendor of Truth, Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II definitively reaffirms the constant teaching of the Church: “Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsice malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances” (80).

Some critics of the Church’s position regularly misreport it (perhaps unintentionally) in a way that makes it an easy target for criticism. They say the Church condemns material acts or physical behaviors independently of the quality of the act of will involved.
This is not what the Church teaches. Moral acts cannot be defined by specifying only the physical behavior. Two cases of the same physical behavior could carry out quite different choices and so be parts of different moral acts. This is why the Church defines the moral acts prohibited by moral absolutes as types of choices, and not as types of physical behavior. Contraception is the prevention of conception whether as an end or as a means, but not all conception-preventing behavior involves the choice to contracept. Lying is the saying of what one thinks is false with the intention to deceive. It is the intentional killing of innocent people that is intrinsically evil (cf. Pope John Paul II, encyclical The Gospel of Life, Evangelium Vitae, 57 [1995]), and so on. Pope John Paul clarified this point in Veritatis Splendor: “By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person” (78).

The basis for absolute moral norms is not difficult to understand. The basic moral criterion is that we should love God and love our neighbor as ourself. To love someone is to will what is genuinely good to him or her, and rejoice in his or her good. Loving God means rejoicing in God’s goodness and also loving other persons and ourselves, since God’s plan in creating is to direct persons to their fulfillment (in their human nature as well as a communion in his own divine life). So, any choice that by the nature of the case involves a suppression of our love of God, neighbor, or self, is wrong in whatever circumstances it might be made. To love God and neighbor involves willing to our neighbors and ourself their and our genuine good. As human beings, our genuine good includes bodily life and health, knowledge of truth and appreciation of beauty, friendship, integration of the various aspects of ourselves, religion, and so on. A choice that is by its nature contrary to or unduly neglectful of any of these basic and intrinsic goods of the human person is morally wrong (cf. Veritatis Splendor, 72).

See: Consequentialism; Deontology; Law of Christ; Moral Principles, Christian; Natural Law; Proportionalism; Teleological Ethics; Utilitarianism.

Suggested Readings: CCC 1749-1756. John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, Veritatis Splendor; The Gospel of Life, Evangelium Vitae. G. Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles, Chs. 6, 10; G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ, Chs. 6, 10. J. Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth. W. May, Moral Absolutes.

Patrick Lee




Russell Shaw. Our Sunday Visitor's Encyclopedia of Catholic Doctrine. Copyright © 1997, Our Sunday Visitor.

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Last Updated: Sunday, April 01, 2001 03:24:19 PM