COOPERATION

Sometimes one’s actions assist another in his morally wrong actions, without one’s wanting that to be so. For example: Some of our taxes go to fund abortions; or a postman may notice that some of the mail he delivers is pornography. These and similar situations raise the following question: To what extent may we perform actions that assist the wrongdoing of others? When is it morally right to cooperate with evil?

Clearly, many instances of cooperation are morally wrong. Nazi SS officers at the end of World War II were rationalizing when they claimed they were “only following orders” in committing atrocities. But then, what are the criteria for distinguishing morally right from morally wrong cooperation?
The Church distinguishes between formal cooperation and material cooperation. Formal cooperation in a morally evil act is always morally wrong, no exceptions; material cooperation is sometimes right, although not always. In formal cooperation one shares in the action of another to the extent of intending the morally evil act. For example, if a physician prescribes contraceptive pills for use in contracepting, then he or she intends that they be taken in the manner prescribed; thus, he or she formally cooperates in the contraceptive act. Similarly, those in a Catholic hospital who decide to refer patients to other hospitals for abortions intend to facilitate their wrongdoing; their cooperation in abortion is formal. In formal cooperation both the principal (the one whose wrongdoing is assisted) and the one cooperating share in the same moral act. If the principal’s act is gravely wrong, as in the examples just mentioned, so is the cooperator’s act.

In material cooperation one’s act assists or facilitates or makes possible another’s wrongdoing, but one does not intend the wrongdoing; the wrongdoing is a side effect of one’s own distinct act. For example, the postman intends to deliver what is sent through the mail; that what he delivers is pornographic, and that the recipients use it immorally rather than destroying it, is not part of his act, not intended by him.
One may cooperate with wrongdoing by omission as well as by actually doing something. This happens when one’s omission facilitates or enables another’s wrongdoing. In this case, too, the cooperation may be either formal or material, depending on whether the principal’s evil act or its success is intended or not. For example, if the head of a Catholic high school knows of a teacher undermining the faith but does nothing, he or she at least materially cooperates.

Morally Right Or Not? • Some material cooperation is morally right and some is not. For example, the postman is surely justified in performing his job, despite the assistance it gives to the person using pornography. However, suppose a nurse working in a public hospital is ordered to assist at an abortion, assistance involving handing instruments to the physician in charge. This would be material cooperation. However, although there may be some rare circumstances in which the nurse might be justified in doing so, in most cases providing such material cooperation would be unjust; that is, in most cases it would violate the golden rule. Moreover, it would probably give the impression of approval and almost certainly would be a failure to bear witness to the truth about the sanctity of all human life. This latter consideration calls attention to the fact that there can be no material cooperation in a particular case if materially cooperating would give scandal: One’s own seeming approval of evil might lead another or others to approve it in fact.

So, how does one distinguish between material cooperation that is morally justified and that which is not? Various points should be considered. Overall, the question concerns the rightness or wrongness of performing an act that causes bad side effects. In material cooperation, the act one does is not in itself wrong, but it causes the bad side effect of facilitating or enabling someone else’s wrongdoing. There must be some reason serious enough to justify accepting this bad side effect. As with causing bad side effects in general, so here, too, the question usually is one of justice or fairness: Is my accepting this bad side effect just? If the bad side effect were happening to me, instead of to someone else, would I expect the other person to forgo the action causing the bad side effect?

All of the other considerations one can point to are subsidiary to answering this question. These other considerations include: How much harm would one suffer if one did not materially cooperate? If one refused to cooperate, would this prevent the evil action? Will the cooperation involve a risk to someone’s salvation? Will this cooperation impair the witness that one should give to God’s truth and love? There is no clear-cut method for arriving at an answer in every case. One must apply the golden rule and take into account the relevant principles and circumstances as best one can.

See: Absolute Moral Norms; Cardinal Virtues; Double Effect; Human Goods; Modes of Responsibility; Natural Law; Synderesis; Teleological Ethics.
Suggested Readings: CCC 1949-1960. G. Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles, pp. 300-303; Vol. 2, Living a Christian Life, pp. 440-444.

Patrick Lee




Russell Shaw. Our Sunday Visitor's Encyclopedia of Catholic Doctrine. Copyright © 1997, Our Sunday Visitor.

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Last Updated: Sunday, April 01, 2001 03:24:19 PM